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A model proposed by Sornette, Takayasu, and Zhou for describing hyperinflation regimes based
on adaptive expectations expressed in terms of a power law which leads to a finite-time singularity
is revisited. It is suggested to express the price index evolution explicitly in terms of the parameters
introduced along the theoretical formulation avoiding any combination of them used in the original
work. This procedure allows to study unambiguously the uncertainties of such parameters when an
error is assigned to the measurement of the price index. In this way, it is possible to determine an
uncertainty in the critical time at which the singularity occurs. For this purpose, Monte Carlo sim-
ulation techniques are applied. The hyperinflation episodes of Peru (1969-90) and Weimar Germany
(1920-3) are reexamined. The first analyses performed within this framework of the very extreme
hyper-inflations occurred in Greece (1941-4) and Yugoslavia (1991-4) are reported. The study of the
hyperinflation spiral experienced just nowadays in Zimbabwe predicts a singularity, i.e., a complete
economic crash within two years.
PACS numbers: 02.40.Xx Singularity theory; 02.50.Ng Monte Carlo methods in probability theory and statis-
tics; 05.10.Ln Monte Carlo methods statistical physics and nonlinear dynamics; 64.60.F- Critical exponents;
89.20.-a Interdisciplinary applications of physics; 89.65.Gh Econophysics; 89.65.-s Social systems
I. INTRODUCTION
Since about one decade there is significant interest in
applications of physical methods in social and economical
sciences [1, 2, 3]. For example, it has been found that the
logarithmic change of the market price in the case of a
hyperinflation episode shows some universal characteris-
tics similar to those observed in physical systems. In such
a regime the price index increases more rapidly than a
simple exponential law [4]. Moreover, it has been shown
that such a super-exponential law indeed finishes with a
finite-time singularity [5] like several physical systems.
Let us recall that the rate of inflation i(t) is defined as
i(t) =
P (t)− P (t−∆t)
P (t−∆t)
=
P (t)
P (t−∆t)
− 1 , (1)
where P (t) is the price at time t and ∆t is the period
of the measurements. In economics the terminology “hy-
perinflation” is used in rather rough sense to specify very
hight inflation that is “out of control”, a condition in
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which prices increase rapidly as a currency loses its prop-
erty as medium of exchange, store of value, and unit of
account. No precise definition of hyperinflation is univer-
sally accepted. One simple definition requires a monthly
inflation rate of 20 or 30% or more. In informal usage
the term is often applied to much lower rates. In 1956,
Cagan published The Monetary Dynamics of Hyperinfla-
tion [6], generally regarded as the first serious study of
hyperinflation and its effects. There it is defined that
“inflation rates per month exceeding 50%” determine a
scenario of hyperinflation.
During periods of very hight inflation the frequent
change of prices destroys rapidly the real wages and the
unknown future of the economic structure diminishes the
flow of inversions. Such situations are very costly to so-
ciety, the workers have to be paid more frequently (even
daily) and there are rushes to spend the currency be-
fore prices rise further causing enormous “shoe-leather
costs” (in economics it means: resources wasted when
inflation encourages people to do more trips to banks
and stores wearing out their shoes). These effects are
accompanied with a strong devaluation of the currency
which causes a decline in real public revenues increas-
ing the fiscal deficit. Hyperinflation reduces real value
of taxes collected, which are often set in nominal terms
2feature is known as the Olivera-Tanzi effect, after Oliv-
era [7] and Tanzi [8] who were the first to interpret it by
means of standard analytical tools [9]. The occurrence of
the Olivera-Tanzi effect may impulse a rapid expansion
of nominal money and credit. If people expect a money
supply growth, then this would lead to expecting higher
inflation. The expectation of higher inflation raises in-
flation rate even if money growth does not actually in-
crease. Once people start to expect an inflation regime,
their expectations may lead to strong positive feedbacks
that make inflation run away. This scenario produce an
important crisis in the population. The real investment,
loans and development diminish, while the unemploy-
ment and political unrest grow significantly. Moreover,
some of these effects usually continue after the hyperin-
flation has been stopped. Therefore, models of hyper-
inflation are considered very useful by macro-economists
because detecting hyperinflation in an early stage might
contribute to avoid such a tragedy.
There are several remarkable historical examples of hy-
perinflation. Some of them were originated after World
Wars [6]. The most famous and studied cases are those
occurred in Germany and Hungary in the early 1920’s
after World War I and in Hungary at the end of World
War II. However, there are other extreme examples, for
instance, that of Greece during the military occupation
(1941 − 4) [6, 10, 11]. On the other hand, there were
other cases which are not related to wars like that in
Latin America in the 1980’s [12, 13] and more recently
that occurred during the transition period from a Cen-
trally Planned economy to a more Free Market oriented
economy in countries of East Europe and in the successor
states emerged after the dissolution of the Soviet Union
[12].
As a matter of fact, the end of Central Planning in
Europe - whether it came as a result of slow decay or of
rapid collapse - was frequently accompanied by bursts of
high inflation. An important example of such a behavior
is Yugoslavia, where two periods of very hight inflation
in short time were experienced. The first had a long
build-up during the 1980’s and peaked in 1989 reaching
high, but not very extreme inflation only briefly. The
second one developed just at the end of Centrally Planed
economy and enhanced by the Civil War is the worst
episode of hyperinflation in History. This very severe
hyperinflation occurred in the period 1991− 4 [14, 15].
The inflation rates at the end of extreme hyper-
inflations reached very impressive amounts per month.
For instance, the ratios of price indexes for the most se-
vere known incidents of inflation quoted by Cagan [6]
are: in Germany in 1923 P (November-13th)/P (October-
16th)=102.556, i.e., inflation rose about 3.6× 104 percent
per month; in Greece after liberation from the occupa-
tion by German troops in 1944 the ratio P (November-
10th)/P (October-31th)=105.932 means 8.55×107 percent
per ten days and in Hungary after the end of World
War II in 1946 P (end-July)/P (end-June)=1014.6226 cor-
responds to 4.2× 1016 percent per month.
Despite all the unpleasant experiences with hight in-
flation, sometimes, it is still considered to be the apple
of paradise. Since 2000 Zimbabwe exhibits an increas-
ing high inflation rate [16], which is already the highest
in the world. Indeed, the spiral of price growth devel-
oped in that country is nowadays considered an impor-
tant episode of hyperinflation.
Since a long time ago it is known that in the case
of moderate inflation the prices exhibit an exponential
growth [6]. A recent analysis of the hyperinflation in
Germany, Hungary, Brazil, Israel, Nicaragua, Peru, and
Bolivia performed by Mizuno, Takayasu, and Takayasu
[4] indicated that the price indexes or currency exchange
rates of these countries grew according to a double-
exponential function eb1e
b2t
of time (with b1, b2 > 0).
It was shown that this super-exponential growth can be
obtained from a nonlinear positive feedback process in
which the past market price growth influences the peo-
ple’s expected future price, which itself impacts the a
posteriori realized market price. This process is funda-
mentally based on the mechanism of “adaptive inflation-
ary expectation” and it is similar to the positive feed-
backs occurring during transmission of information due
to imitative and herd behaviors [3, 17].
The double-exponential model of Mizuno et al. [4]
gives a useful mathematical description of hyperinflation,
however, it does not provide a rigorous determination
of the end of the hyperinflation regime. More recently,
Sornette, Takayasu, and Zhou [5] re-examined the the-
ory developed in Ref. [4] and showed that the double-
exponential law is in fact a discrete-time approximation
of a general power law growth endowed with a finite-time
singularity at some critical time tc.
Let us notice that singularities occur in different sorts
of dynamical systems and are spontaneously reached in
finite time. Such a behavior can be found in models of
either physical or other kind of systems. In the case of
physics we can mention the Euler equations of inviscid
fluids [18], the surface curvature on the free surface of
a conducting fluid in an electric field [19], the equations
of General Relativity coupled to a mass field leading to
the formation of black holes [20], the vortex collapse of
systems of point vortexes [21], or the Eulers disks as a
rotating coin [22]. On the other hand, this kind of singu-
larity is also present in models of micro-organisms aggre-
gating to form fruiting bodies [23] and in the dynamics
of the world population, and the economic and financial
indexes [24].
The analysis of the finite-time singularity proposed in
Ref. [5] allows to determine the theoretical end of the
hyperinflation regime. However, from the practical point
of view it is also important to estimate an uncertainty of
tc in terms of variations of P (t). An analysis of this issue
is just developed in the present work.
In Sec. II we revise the theoretical formulations pub-
lished in Refs. [4, 5] introducing a careful treatment of
the initial time of the series of data t0. The price in-
dex evolution is expressed explicitly in terms of the free
3parameters introduced along the theoretical formulation
avoiding any combination of them. In addition, we pro-
pose a procedure to determine the uncertainties of the
fitting parameters when an error is assigned to the mea-
surement of the price index. Monte Carlo simulation
techniques are used for the error analysis. In this way
quotes for tc are set. A study of the hyperinflation in
Peru and Germany are presented as testing cases. In Sec.
III we report the first studies of the very extreme hyper-
inflations of Greece and Yugoslavia performed within the
framework outlined in the present work. Furthermore, on
the basis of an analysis of data of the current trend of
the hyperinflation in Zimbabwe, we predict an economic
crash in this country in about two years. Finally, the
main conclusions are summarized in Sec. IV.
II. THEORETICAL BACKGROUND
In the academic financial literature, the simplest and
most robust way to account for inflation is to take loga-
rithm. Therefore, the continuous rate of change in prices
is usually defined as
C(t) =
∂ lnP (t)
∂t
. (2)
Usually the derivative of Eq. (2) is expressed in a discrete
way as
C(t) =
[lnP (t+∆t)− lnP (t)]
∆t
=
1
∆t
ln
[
P (t+∆t)
P (t)
]
.
(3)
The growth rate of price over one period is defined as
r(t) ≡ C(t)∆t = ln
[
P (t+∆t)
P (t)
]
= p(t+∆t)−p(t) . (4)
Here, a notation widely utilized in the academic litera-
ture, p(t) = lnP (t), is introduced. When r(t) takes big
values over a large period of time a hyperinflation regime
is to be reached.
In his pioneering work, Cagan [6] proposed a model of
inflation based on the mechanism of “adaptive inflation-
ary expectation” of positive feedback between realized
growth of the market price P (t) and the growth of peo-
ple’s averaged expectation price P ∗(t). These two prices
are thought to evolve due to a positive feedback mecha-
nism: an upward change of market price P (t) in a unit
time ∆t induces a rise in the people’s expectation price
P ∗(t), and such an anticipation pulls up the market price.
Cagan’s assumption that the growth rate of P ∗(t) is
proportional to the past realized growth rate of the mar-
ket price P (t) is expressed by the following equation
P (t+∆t)
P (t)
=
P ∗(t)
P (t)
=
P ∗(t)
P ∗(t−∆t)
, (5)
P ∗(t+∆t)
P ∗(t)
=
P (t)
P (t−∆t)
. (6)
Now, one may introduce
r∗(t) ≡ C∗(t)∆t = ln
[
P ∗(t+∆t)
P ∗(t)
]
. (7)
So, expressions (5) and (6) are equivalent to
r(t) = r∗(t−∆t) , (8)
r∗(t) = r(t −∆t) , (9)
whose solution is r(t + ∆t) = r(t −∆t) which indicates
a constant finite growth rate equal to its initial value
r(t) = r(t0) = r0. Since the market price is given by
P (t) = P (t0) exp
[
1
∆t
∫ t
t0
r(t′)dt′
]
, (10)
Eqs. (8) and (9) lead to a steady state exponential infla-
tion
P (t) = P0 exp
[ r0
∆t
(t− t0)
]
, (11)
where P (t0) = P0. This form can be reduced to a linear
form in t
lnP (t) = lnP0 + C0 (t− t0) , (12)
where
C0 =
r0
∆t
, (13)
is the initial growth in prices.
A. Double-exponential growth
Mizuno et al. [4] have analyzed the hyperinflation
of Germany (1920 − 3), Hungary (1945 − 6), Brazil
(1969−94), Israel (1969−85), Nicaragua (1969−91), Peru
(1969−90) and Bolivia (1969−85), and showed that the
price indexes or currency exchange rates of these coun-
tries grew super-exponentially according to a double-
exponential function eb1e
b2t
of time (with b1, b2 > 0).
These authors generalized Eq. (7) writing
P ∗(t+∆t)
P ∗(t)
=
(
P (t)
P (t−∆t)
)b
= [1 + i(t)]
b
, (14)
which can be expressed as
r∗(t) = b r(t−∆t) . (15)
Cagan’s original model is recovered for the special case
b = 1. An exponent b larger than 1 avoids systematic
errors of other models capturing the fact that the ad-
justment of the expected price P ∗(t) is weak for small
changes of the realized market prices and becomes very
strong for large deviations.
4The system of Eqs. (8) and (15) gives
r(t +∆t) = b r(t−∆t) . (16)
In the continuous limit it becomes
dr
dt
= b2 r(t) , (17)
with b2 = (b− 1)/(2∆t) > 0. The solution is
r(t) = r0e
b2 (t−t0) . (18)
Upon introducing this result into Eq. (10) one gets the
double exponential form for the market price
P (t) = P0 exp
{
C0
b2
[
eb2 (t−t0) − 1
]}
. (19)
A straightforward calculation shows that in the limit
b2 → 0 the simple exponential of Eq. (11) is recovered.
For b2(t− t0) >> 1 one gets the expression of Ref. [4]
P (t) ∝ eb1 e
b2 (t−t0)
, (20)
with b1 = C0/b2.
B. Finite-time singularity
A further generalization of the Cagan’s model has been
reported by Sornette et al. [5]. These authors proposed a
different version of the nonlinear feedback process. They
kept expression (5) or equivalently Eq. (8) and replaced
Eq. (14) or equivalently expression (15) by
r∗(t) = r(t−∆t)+a [r(t−∆t)]γ , with γ > 1 . (21)
Note that this formulation (21) retrieves both previous
proposals: the Cagan’s formulation (9) is get for a = 0
and the Mizuno et al.’s form (15) is obtained for γ = 1.
The authors of Ref. [5] claim that their formulation
better captures the intrinsically nonlinear process of the
formation of expectations. Indeed, if r(t − ∆t) is small
(explicitly, if is is smaller 1/a1/γ), the second nonlinear
term a [r(t−∆t)]γ in the right-hand-side of (21) is negli-
gible compared with the first Cagan’s term r(t−∆t) and
one recovers the exponentially growing inflation regime
of normal times. However, when the realized growth
rate becomes significant, people’s expectations start to
amplify these realized growth rates, leading to a super-
exponential growth. Geometrically, the difference be-
tween the formulation of Eq. (21) and that of Eq. (15)
consists in replacing a straight of slope b larger than 1
by a upwards convex function with slope at the origin
and whose local slope increases monotonically with the
argument.
This theory provides the first practical approach for
predicting its future path until its end. In practice,
the end of an hyperinflation regime is expected to occur
somewhat earlier than at the asymptotic critical time tc,
because governments and central banks are forced to do
something before the infinity is reached in finite time.
Such actions are the equivalent of finite-size and bound-
ary condition effects in physical systems undergoing sim-
ilar finite-time singularities. Hyperinflation regimes are
of special interest as they emphasize in an almost pure
way the impact of collective behavior of people interact-
ing through their expectations.
1. Determination of the critical time
Putting Eq. (8) together with expression (21) leads to
r(t +∆t) = r(t−∆t) + a [r(t−∆t)]γ . (22)
Taking the continuous limit, expression (22) becomes
dr
dt
= a1 [r(t)]
γ , (23)
where a1 is a positive coefficient with dimensions of the
inverse of time. In this case the growth rate accelerates
with time according to [r(t)]γ−1. As a consequence of this
power law acceleration the solution of Eq. (23) exhibits
singularities in finite-time [25]
r(t) = r0
(
tc − t0
tc − t
)1/(γ−1)
. (24)
The critical time is determined by the initial condition
r0, the exponent γ, and the coefficient a1
tc = t0 +
1
a1 (γ − 1) [r0](γ−1)
. (25)
We must notice that in Ref. [5] there are misprints: i)
the coefficient a1 should be dropped from Eq. (14) and
ii) the expression for tc given just below that equation is
incorrect. See, for instance, Eq. (17) in Ref. [26].
A power law singularity is essentially indistinguishable
from an exponential of an exponential of time, except
when the distance tc − t from the finite time singularity
becomes comparable with the time step ∆t. The main
difference between the formulations proposed by Mizuno
et al. [4] and Sornette et al. [5] is that the latter one
contains an information on the end of the growth phase,
embodied in the existence of the critical tc.
In this case, Eq. (10) leads to
ln
[
P (t)
P0
]
=
1
∆t
∫ t
t0
r(t′)dt′
=
r0
α
(
tc − t0
∆t
) [(
tc − t
tc − t0
)
−α
− 1
]
= C0
(
tc − t0
α
) [(
tc − t
tc − t0
)
−α
− 1
]
,
(26)
5with
α =
2− γ
γ − 1
. (27)
For t−t0 = ∆t << tc−t0 one obtains ln[P (t0+∆t)/P0] =
C0∆t = r0 recovering the definition of Eq. (4).
The time dependence of the market price P (t) exhibits
the two different regimes depending on the sign of α:
(i) For 1 < γ < 2 one gets α > 0 yielding a finite-time
singularity in the market price itself
ln
[
P (t)
P0
]
=
C0 (tc − t0)
α
[(
tc − t0
tc − t
)α
− 1
]
. (28)
In this regime the price exhibits a finite-time singular-
ity at the same critical value tc as the growth rate.
Hence, this solution corresponds to a genuine divergence
of lnP (t).
(ii) For γ > 2 one gets α < 0 yielding a finite-time
singularity in r(t) but the market price evolve as
ln
[
P (t)
P0
]
=
C0 (tc − t0)
α
[(
tc − t
tc − t0
)
−α
− 1
]
=
C0 (tc − t0)
α′
[
1−
(
tc − t
tc − t0
)α′ ]
,(29)
with
α′ = −α =
γ − 2
γ − 1
. (30)
Here it holds 0 < α′ < 1. As time approaches the critical
value tc the price converges to the value C0(tc − t0)/α
′
leading to equilibrium, this limit is reached more rapidly
when α′ → 1.
Let us now discuss the structure of Eq. (28) written in
the form
p(t) = p0 +
C0 (tc − t0)
α
[(
tc − t0
tc − t
)α
− 1
]
. (31)
By fitting the measured price index to this expression one
can determine the critical time tc together with the pa-
rameters α and C0. However, since at t = t0 the square
bracket vanishes, by using explicitly the assumed (mea-
sured) P0, i.e. setting p0 = lnP0, one would perform a
fit with a fixed point at the beginning of the hyperinfla-
tion episode which may bias the fitting procedure for tc.
Therefore, it is convenient to consider p0 as an additional
free parameter. On the oder hand, Eq. (31) leads to Eq.
(15) of Ref. [5]
p(t) = p0 −
C0 (tc − t0)
α
+
C0 (tc − t0)
1+α
α (tc − t)α
= A+B(tc − t)
−α , (32)
where
A = p0 −
C0 (tc − t0)
α
, (33)
and
B =
C0 (tc − t0)
1+α
α
. (34)
Notice that in the formulation proposed in the present
work, see Eq. (31), all the free parameters have their own
physical meaning: p0 is the logarithm of P0; C0 is the
initial growth in price; α is fixed by the exponent γ of the
power law; and tc is the end-point time of hyperinflation.
While in the case of Eq. (15) of Sornette et al. [5] the
coefficientsA and B are combinations of that parameters.
This fact becomes important for an error analysis.
To compare episodes of hyperinflation it is useful to
determine the time interval, τ2(t), needed for doubling
the price index close to the singularity. Starting from
Eq. (24) or Eq. (28) one can demonstrate that such a
quantity is given by
τ2(t) =
ln 2
C0
(
tc − t
tc − t0
)1+α
=
ln 2
αB
(tc − t)
1+α . (35)
2. Estimation of uncertainties
Before analyzing hyperinflation episodes, we shall fo-
cus attention on an important issue. Indeed, the determi-
nation of the fitting parameters cannot be considered as
unambiguous. Therefore, besides giving the critical time
tc and other parameters, it is also of interest to provide
an estimation of its uncertainties. Hence, in the present
work we analyzed the variation of the free parameters
when one takes into account an uncertainty in the mea-
sured rate of inflation i(t). The tabulated price index at
a given time tn = t0 + n∆t is evaluated according to a
formula derived from Eq. (1)
P (t = tn) =
n∏
k=0
[1 + i(tk = k∆t)] , (36)
where P0 = 1 + i(t0) is usually fixed at unity, i.e., i(t0)
is set zero. By assuming that each measured i(tk) has
an uncertainty ∆i(tk) it is possible to assign an uncer-
tainty to P (t). However, instead of evaluating ∆P (t),
we preferred to estimate directly the error of the fitting
parameters.
For this purpose, we assumed that each value of the
inflation rate can be represented by a gaussian distribu-
tion with mean value ı¯k = i(tk) and a standard deviation
σk = ∆i(tk). These distributions were sampled by using
Monte Carlo techniques in order to get for each i(tk) a
random series of values ij(tk) with j = 1→ m. The size
m of these series was taken large enough to satisfy to a
good approximation
ı¯k =
1
m
m∑
j=1
ij(tk) = i(tk) , (37)
61965 1970 1975 1980 1985 1990 1995
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FIG. 1: Semi-logarithmic plot of the yearly price index of
Peru from 1969 to 1990 marked with open diamonds [P (t0 =
1969) = 1] and its fit to Eq. (31). The vertical solid line
indicates the predicted critical time tc and vertical dashed
lines are error quotes for it, see text for explanations.
and
σ¯k =
√√√√ 1
m
m∑
j=1
[ij(tk)− x¯k]2 = ∆i(tk) . (38)
In this way m generations of inflation rates were built,
each one is labeled by j and composed of the obtained
values ij(tk) for all k. Then each generation j was fit-
ted to Eq. (31) providing sets of fitting parameters tc(j),
α(j), C0(j), and p0(j). In order to speedup the proce-
dure programs like those included in Ref. [27] may be
used. Finally, for each parameter the average value and
variance were evaluated by using expressions like that of
Eqs. (37) and (38). These averages t¯c, α¯, C¯0, and p¯0
were compared with the values tc, α, C0, and p0 yielded
by a direct fit of the tabulated P (t), and the correspond-
ing differences were evaluated. When all the ratios of
these differences over the corresponding standard devia-
tions were smaller that 0.1 the obtained results have been
accepted.
To perform this kind of error analysis in the case of a fit
to Eq. (15) of Sornette et al. [5] would not be appropriate
because both coefficients A and B depend explicitly on
the remaining parameters tc and α and therefore their
errors would be strongly correlated.
III. ANALYSIS AND NUMERICAL RESULTS
In a first step, before beginning the analysis of the
episodes announced in Sec. I, we shall describe the ap-
plication of our procedure to cases already treated by
Sornette et al. [5]. In particular, we shall report the
1989.5 1990 1990.5 1991 1991.5 1992 1992.5 1993
0
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t
c
D
is
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∆ i(t) = 25 % 
m = 4000 
Peru 
FIG. 2: Distribution of the values of tc determined from so-
lutions of Eq. (31) for the set of price index obtained when
the error assigned to measured inflation rate i(t) is 25%. The
solid curve is the gaussian distribution.
studies of the hyperinflation cycles of Peru and Weimar
Germany. The first case is a process developed over two
decades, while the latter one was build-up over a couple
of years only. In this way the selected checking exam-
ples cover the evolution characterizing the cases to be
analyzed for the first time within the framework outlined
above.
Next, we shall analyze the very extreme cases of Greece
and Yugoslavia. Furthermore, we shall deal with the hy-
perinflation exhibited nowadays by the economic system
in Zimbabwe. This case is very encouraging because the
spiral of increasing prices is not finished yet. Hence, an
a priori prediction for the critical time can be made.
At the end of the section we shall compare the most
severe hyper-inflations.
A. Checking cases
Figure 1 shows the price index of Peru during the pe-
riod 1969-90. The parameters obtained from a mean-
square fit of these data to Eq. (31) together with the
root-mean-square residue of the fit, χ, are quoted in Ta-
ble I. In order to facilitate a quantitative comparison
with the analysis of Sornette et al. [5] their values of tc
and α are included in Table I, while that of A and B
are quoted in Table II together with our evaluations by
means of Eqs. (33) and (34). A glance at these tables
indicates a perfect agreement between both fits. The
quality of the fit can be observed in Fig. 1, this figure is
to be compared with Fig. 2 of Ref. [5].
For the analysis of the uncertainties we assumed that
all i(t) have the same relative error ∆i(t)[%]. The relative
errors of the parameters were determined as a function
7TABLE I: Analyzed hyper-inflations, the critical time tc and remaining fitting parameters with the estimated uncertainties.
Country Currency Period Parameters χ Ref.
tc α C0 p0
Perua Inti 1969-1990 1991.29 ± 0.37 0.29 ± 0.13 0.18± 0.02 −0.38± 0.07 0.322 PW
1991.29 0.3 0.291 [5]
Zimbabweb ZW-Dollar 1980-2007 2009.50 ± 0.76 0.79 ± 0.21 0.08± 0.01 0.10 ± 0.06 0.234 PW
Germanyc Mark 1920:01-1921:05 −0.008 ± 0.004 0.64 ± 0.11 0.076 PW
1921:05-1923:11 1924:01:05±11 0.56 ± 0.12 0.103 ± 0.012 0.57 ± 0.09 0.580 PW
1920:01-1923:11 1923:12:18 0.6 0.490 [5]
Greeceb Drachma 1941:04-1942:10 0.263 ± 0.015 0.14 ± 0.09 0.124 PW
1943:02-1944:10 1944:12:02±13 0.17 ± 0.14 0.210 ± 0.022 3.91 ± 0.09 0.230 PW
Yugoslaviad Dinar 1990:12-1994:01 1994:03:10±4 0.53 ± 0.05 0.335 ± 0.018 −1.52± 0.14 0.930 PW
aInflation data are taken from a Table published by the Interna-
tional Monetary Fund (IMF) [12].
bInflation data are taken from Ref. [16].
cInflation data are taken from Ref. [6].
dInflation data are taken from Ref. [14].
TABLE II: Parameters A and B and exponent γ of the power
law given by Eq. (23) together with its uncertainty.
Country Parameters Ref.
∆t A B γ
Peru year -14.16 34. 1.78 ± 0.08 PW
-14.17 34. 1.8 [5]
Zimbabwe year 1.56 ± 0.07 PW
Germany month -5.22 274.a 1.64 ± 0.05 PW
-5.09 272.a 1.6 [5]
Hungary -1.02 2370.a 1.5 [5]
Greece month -21.62 78.a 1.85 ± 0.10 PW
Yugoslavia month -25.69 1030.a 1.65 ± 0.02 PW
aFor the evaluation of this quantity time is taken in days.
0% 5% 10% 15% 20% 25% 30% 35% 40%
0%
1%
2%
3%
4%
5%
6%
7%
8%
9%
∆i(t)
∆
(t c
−
t 0
)  
 a
nd
   
∆
γ Peru 
FIG. 3: Standard deviation (s.d.) for free parameters ob-
tained from solutions of Eq. (31) as a function of the error
assigned to measured inflation rate i(t) expressed in percent.
The solid and dashed curves are the s.d. for tc − t0 and γ,
respectively, also expressed in percent.
of ∆i(t) according the procedure outlined in Sec. II B 2.
The requirements of Eqs. (37) and (38) are reached sat-
isfactorily well for m > 2000. The distribution of re-
sults for tc obtained by solving Eq. (31) for each gen-
eration of P (t) built up from Monte Carlo samplings at
∆i(t) = 25% is displayed in Fig. 2 together with the
corresponding gaussian distribution. This comparison
shows a fair agreement. For bigger ∆i(t) the distribu-
tion becomes asymmetric exhibiting a repulsion towards
larger tc and the standard deviation increases dramati-
cally. This effect is shown in Fig. 3, where the results for
“the most important parameters”, i.e., the critical time
tc − t0 and exponent γ of the power law for the growth
rate r(t)
γ =
2 + α
1 + α
(39)
obtained for 3% . ∆i(t) . 35% and m = 4000 are
plotted. These data indicate that the uncertainties of
the parameters are to a good approximation linear func-
tions up to ∆i(t) ≈ 30%, then increase dramatically. At
∆i(t) ≈ 35% a distribution equivalent to that displayed
in Fig. 2 differs from a gaussian. In this work we adopted
25% as a reasonable relative error of the measured i(t).
The uncertainties of the fitting parameters quoted in Ta-
ble I correspond to that quote. The uncertainty of tc is
also displayed in Fig. 1.
Sornette et al. [5] have analyzed the evolution of the
exchange rate between the German Mark and the US dol-
lar during the period 1920:01-1923:11 (from now on when
dealing with monthly data the notation Year:Month:Day
will be used). The fit of all that data to Eq. (32) yielded
the values quoted in the present Tables I and II. In order
to compare these results with that provided by an alter-
native information, we analyzed the evolution of the price
index taking the data from Table B3 of Ref. [6]. Figure
4 shows the price index of Germany during the period
1920:01-1923:11, the open diamonds are values normal-
ized to P (t0 = 1919 : 12 : 15) = 1. A comparison of this
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FIG. 4: Semi-logarithmic plot of the monthly price index
of Germany from 1920:01 to 1923:11 marked with open di-
amonds. The straight line is a fit to Eq. (40) for the period
1920:01 to 1921:05, while the solid curve is the fit to Eq. (31)
for the period 1921:05 to 1923:11. The vertical solid line in-
dicates the predicted critical time tc and vertical dashed lines
are its error quotes, see text for explanations.
figure with Fig. 4 of Ref. [5] indicates that the cumu-
lated price index over the considered period is similar to
the total variation of the exchange rate. It is important
to point out that data of the exchange rate were taken
at the beginning of each month, while the values of the
price index correspond to the middle of the month.
A careful analysis of price index indicates that during
the period 1920:01 to 1921:05 the cumulated inflation is
approximately zero. This regime can be well described
by the original theory of Cagan condensed in Eq. (12),
which can be cast into the form
p(t) = p0 + C0 (t− t0) . (40)
A fit to this equation yielded the values of p0 and C0
given in Table I, where the uncertainties corresponding
to an error of 25% in the measured i(t) are also quoted.
The quality of the fit may be observed in Fig. 4. The
slightly negative slope C0 is due to the fact that in this
period several months exhibit deflation. Consequently,
in order to study the hyperinflation episode we fitted to
Eq. (31) data of the period 1921:05 to 1923:11 only. This
procedure yielded the values of the free parameters and
the χ listed in Table I. The quality of the fit may be
observed in Fig. 4 and it is similar to that obtained in
Ref. [5] as indicated by the values of χ. The evaluated
results of A and B are included in Table II (for the eval-
uation of these quantities the time is taken in days). The
agreement between the values for α, A, and B obtained
in the present work and that of Ref. [5] is quite good. In
the case of the critical time there is a delay of about 15
days mainly caused by the shift of the date attributed to
measurements.
An error analysis similar to that described in the case
of Peru indicates that the uncertainties of the fitting pa-
rameters are linear functions beyond ∆i(t) = 35%. This
is due to the fact that the price index at the end of
the period of measurement rose a bigger value in the
case of Germany (P (tmax) ≈ 5 × 10
10) than of Peru
(P (tmax) ≈ 3 × 10
7) and, therefore, the finite-time sin-
gularity is better defined in the former case. The photos
of banknotes of hyperinflation episodes may be found in
the paper money gallery at the web site [28].
For the hyperinflation regimes analyzed in the remain-
ing part of this section the error of the free parameters
are determined assuming ∆i(t) = 25%. This uncertainty
is large enough to provide a “reasonable” error quotes.
B. The Greek catastrophic episode
Let us begin the description of the Greek hyperinflation
by citing a fragment of the talk addressed by Nicholas C.
Garganas, Governor of the Bank of Greece [29]. He said:
“In April 1941, the Axis Powers occupied Greece. For
several years, London became the seat of both the ex-
iled Greek government and the Bank of Greece, with the
Bank’s gold secretly transferred to South Africa. Within
occupied Greece , the economic situation became increas-
ingly grim and hundreds of thousands of Greeks died of
hunger. The Axis powers forced the country to pay not
only for the upkeep of the occupying troops, but also for
their military operations in Southeastern Europe. The
puppet regime established by the occupiers forced the
Bank of Greece to resort to the printing press. As a
result, the country was beset with hyperinflation; be-
tween April 1941 and October 1944, the cost of living
rose 2.3× 109 times. In these difficult circumstances, the
country’s economic system collapsed. To give another
example of the magnitude of inflation during the occu-
pation, let me mention that in November 1944, imme-
diately after liberation, a so-called “new” drachma was
introduced; it was set equal to 50×109 “old” drachmas!”
Figure 5 shows in a semi-logarithmic plot the price
index of Greece taken from Table B6 of Ref. [6]. The
open diamonds are monthly data taken at the end of each
month. The open circle is the value for 1944:11:10, i.e.,
it corresponds to the first 10 days of November. These
data are normalized to P (t0 = 1941 : 04 : 30) = 1. In this
drawing one can observe the value 2.3 × 109 mentioned
in the previous paragraph. A simple inspection indicates
two well differentiated regimes of inflation. This behavior
can be understood in terms of different phases of the
foreign occupation.
At the beginning conquered Greece was divided into
three zones of control by the occupying powers, Germany,
Italy and Bulgaria. The Germans limited themselves
during the first period of the occupation to the strate-
gically important areas as Athens, Central Macedonia,
Western Crete, and the islands of the Northern Aegean,
and their forces were limited. Bulgaria annexed Thrace
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FIG. 5: Semi-logarithmic plot of the monthly price index of
Greece from 1941:04 to 1944:10 marked with open diamonds.
The open circle is the value of 1944:11. The straight line
is a fit to Eq. (40) for the period 1941:04 to 1942:10, while
the solid curve is a fit to Eq. (31) for the period 1943:02 to
1944:10. The vertical solid line is the predicted critical time
tc, while the vertical dashed lines indicate its error bars.
and Eastern Macedonia, while Italy occupied the greater
part of the country. Between the occupation zones no
movements of goods and people was allowed. The naval
blockade coupled with transfers of agricultural produce
to Germany led to the gradual but firm establishment of
a black market.
Over the period 1941:04 to 1942:10, a dynamics of high
inflation can be observed. The cumulated inflation has
been about 130%, hence, the level of a hyperinflation was
still not reached. This regime can be well described by
the original theory of Cagan given by Eq. (40). A fit of
the price index to that expression yielded the values of
the parameters p0 and C0 quoted in Table I. The quality
of the fit is quite good.
Until the summer of 1942 the resistance movement was
in its infancy, however, at the end of that year became
strong. The spectacular destruction of the Gorgopota-
mos bridge by a force of Greek guerrillas and British
saboteurs on 25 November caused a reaction of the Ital-
ian authorities, in spite of it, the guerrillas were largely
successful in this region, creating “liberated” areas in the
mountainous interior including some towns.
This initial success of the guerrilla diminished the ten-
sion in the population causing a period of small deflation
over four months. This fact can be clearly seen in Fig. 5.
However, the pressure of foreign troops increased and
in 1943 German elite troops were brought into the whole
Greece. A heavy resistance led to German contra-attacks
and reprisals. In September 1943 the Italians surrendered
following the Allied invasion of Italy. Throughout late
1943 and the first half of 1944, the Germans, in coop-
eration with the Bulgarians and aided by Greek collab-
orators launched clearing operations against the Greek
resistance.
During this period, the German forced the Greek trea-
sury to pay huge amounts of “occupation expenses”.
Since the government of Greece could not meet such an
obligation from fiscal taxation (Olivera-Tanzi effect) new
money was printed (seigniorage). The attempt to control
prices failed and the fall off of production in devastated
Greece’s economy led to the collapse of the normal mar-
kets and to an increase of the black market.
Due to the general scenario of the war, the Germans
were forced to evacuate mainland Greece in October
1944. Their withdrew was finished on November 2 and
the exiled government returned to Athens. However, al-
ready with the prospect of the liberation of Greece two
resistance groups (left and right orientated organizations)
began to fight for power. These tensions led almost im-
mediately to a disastrous civil war.
The very difficult situation of the later years of the oc-
cupation caused the catastrophic hyperinflation [6, 30]
displayed in Fig. 5. The inflation reached a peak in
November 1944 after liberation. As mentioned in Sec.
I, in the first ten days of November the inflation rose
the incredible value 8.55 × 107% (see Cagan [6]). The
monthly data from 1942:02 to 1944:10 were fitted to Eq.
(31). The results of the free parameters are listed in Ta-
ble I, the quoted uncertainties correspond to an error of
25% in the measurements of inflation rates. The uncer-
tainty in tc is also displayed in Fig. 5.
By looking at Fig. 5 one realizes that the solid curve
calculated with Eq. (31) reproduces very well the mea-
sured data. Moreover, according to the solid curve the
measured value on November 10 would be reached on
November 25. This anticipated “explosion” of the mar-
ket price has been caused by the interplay of different
strongly increasing “variables”, such as lack of goods
and political uncertainty mentioned above. The obtained
critical time predicts the definitive crash would be on
1944:12:02. The uncertainty estimated by assuming that
the inflation is measured with an error of 25% amounts
about 13 days.
The stratification of wealth caused by hyperinflation
and black markets during the occupation seriously hin-
dered postwar economic development. The Greek govern-
ment undertook several stabilization efforts spread over
a couple of years before price level stability was achieved.
These facts are described in the books written by Palairet
[10] and Lykogiannis [11]. The efforts to confront the hy-
perinflation consisted of a currency conversion (convert-
ibility of the new drachma into British Military Author-
ity Pounds), the creation of an independent supra-central
bank limiting the government’s overdraft at the Bank of
Greece, and a few fiscal reforms to increase taxes or re-
duce expenditures [31].
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C. Yugoslavia - The worst episode in History
The residual Yugoslavia has experienced the highest
recorded hyperinflation in History. This episode occurred
during a period of two difficult circumstances like the
transformation from a Centrally Planned to a rather Free
Market economy and the disastrous civil war 1991-4.
Let us now present a summary of the main events of
the Yugoslav civil war. A last effort to avoid Yugoslavia’s
disintegration was made 3 June 1991 through a joint pro-
posal by Macedonia and Bosnia and Herzegovina, offer-
ing to form a “community of Yugoslav Republics” with
a centrally administered common market, foreign policy,
and national defense. However, Serbia opposed the pro-
posal and the former federal republic of Yugoslavia began
the process of dissolution. On 25 of June 1991 Slovenia
and Croatia both declared their independence from Yu-
goslavia. The national army of Yugoslavia, then made
up of Serbs controlled by the government of Belgrade,
stormed into Slovenia but failed to subdue the separatists
there and withdrew after only ten days of fighting los-
ing interest in a country with almost no Serbs. Instead,
the attention was turned to Croatia, a Catholic country
where Orthodox Serbs made up 12 percent of the pop-
ulation. The civil war started. In order to “protect”
the Serbian minority the central forces aided by Serbian
guerrillas invaded Croatia in July 1991. By the end of
1991, a U.S.-sponsored cease-fire agreement was brokered
between the Serbs and Croats fighting in Croatia. Mace-
donia opted for independence on 20 November 1991. On
29 February 1992, the multi-ethnic republic of Bosnia
and Herzegovina passed a referendum for independence,
but not all Bosnian Serbs agreed. Under the guise of pro-
tecting the Serb minority in Bosnia, the government of
Belgrade channeled arms and military support to them.
So, while the secession of Slovenia andMacedonia came
relatively peacefully, in the case of Croatia and Bosnia
there were devastating wars. In April 1992, the U.S. and
European Community chose to recognize the indepen-
dence of Bosnia, a mostly Muslim country where the Serb
minority made up 32 percent of the population. On April
27, Serbia joined the republic of Montenegro in a smaller
New Yugoslav Republic and responded to Bosnia’s dec-
laration of independence by attacking their capital Sara-
jevo. Foreign governments responded with sanctions, an
embargo was introduced by the United Nations embargo
on 30 May 1992.
The disintegration of the former Yugoslavia led to de-
creased output and fiscal revenue, while transfers to the
Serbian population in Croatia and Bosnia-Herzegovina
as well as military expenditure added to the fiscal prob-
lems. Simultaneously, the economy was changing from
Central Planning to Free Market. In order to finance the
increasing deficit, caused among others by the Olivera-
Tanzi effect, the government printed money. High infla-
tion started to build up in 1991. The sources for the
data of the complete cycle are documented in Petrovic´
and Mladenovic´ [14]. Figure 6 shows the time series of
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FIG. 6: Semi-logarithmic plot of the monthly price index of
Yugoslavia from 1990:12 to 1994:01 marked with open dia-
monds. Data are normalized to P (t0=1990:12)=1. The solid
curve is the fit to Eq. (31). The vertical lines indicate pre-
dicted critical time tc and its error bars.
monthly price index in the period 1990:12 to 1994:01.
The monthly inflation had already risen the category of
hyperinflation at the beginning of 1992 and accelerated
further despite the price freeze attempted in the end of
1993:08. The overall impact of hyperinflation on the price
index reached about 1050 as it is also shown in Fig. 1 of
[15].
As a consequence of the hyperinflation Yugoslavia went
through several currency reforms simply removing zeros
from the paper money. In spite of these reforms, along
this period the highest denomination reached very large
values. The largest nominal value ever officially printed
in Yugoslavia, a banknote of 500,000,000,000 (500 billion)
dinars was released at the end of 1993 (see photo in Ref.
[28]). The overall impact of hyperinflation on currency at
the final reform for stabilization performed at the end of
1994:01 was: 1 Novi Dinar = 1.2× 1027 pre 1990 Dinar,
equivalent to the cumulated price index until 1993:11 (see
Fig. 6).
Many Yugoslavian businesses refused to take the Yu-
goslavian currency at all and the German Deutsche Mark
effectively became the currency of Yugoslavia. But gov-
ernment organizations, government employees and pen-
sioners still got paid in Yugoslavian dinars so there was
still an active exchange in dinars. However, farmers sell-
ing in the free markets refused to sell food for Yugosla-
vian dinars. So, many monetary transactions were ac-
tually taking place in German Marks rather than local
currency. Therefore, the hyperinflation can be also mea-
sured in terms of the black market exchange rate for Ger-
man Marks and Yugoslavian Dinars. As can be observed
in Fig. 1 of Ref. [15] the strengths of hyperinflation given
by the price index and the exchange rate are quite similar
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FIG. 7: Growth rate of the monthly price index during the
hyperinflation of Yugoslavia marked with open circles. The
solid curve was evaluated by using Eq. (41) with the param-
eters listed in Table I. The vertical line indicates the critical
time tc.
(as in the case of Weimar Germany treated above).
The Yugoslav hyperinflation has been studied in a
number of papers by using methods developed in the
framework of economics. For instance, we can mention
the papers of Petrovic´ and Mladenovic´ [14] and Nielsen
[15]. These authors consider the price indexes for 1993:12
and 1994:01 to be unreliable and choose end their analy-
ses end at the latest 1993:11. This is in line with standard
studies of hyperinflation that mostly ignore the last few
observations. Such a procedure is mainly due to the fact
that these models do not contain structural information
over the divergence at the end of a hyperinflation and big
values of price index do not match into the systematics.
However, in that studies the trend of the first logarithmic
differences is analyzed. For instance, Nielsen [15] on the
basis of his Fig. 1 states that such differences exhibit an
exponential growth indicating an accelerating inflation,
but the last three differences are not included in that
figure either.
In standard economic theory, at equilibrium, money
determines price level and implies equilibrium in mar-
kets for other variables of the system. Usually inflation
is associated with money supply growth. However, for
instance, there are studies suggesting that the Yugosla-
vian hyperinflation (1991−4) was not generated by ex-
cess expansion of money stock but, instead, money was
accommodating in this period [32].
In our study we included all the values of price index
displayed in Fig. 6. A fit of these data to Eq. (31) yielded
the free parameters quoted in Table I. The value of χ in-
dicates that the quality of the fit is good. The uncertain-
ties in the parameters determined for ∆i(t) = 25% are
smaller than that obtained previously for Germany and
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FIG. 8: Semi-logarithmic plot of the yearly price index of
Zimbabwe from 1979 to 2007 marked with open diamonds.
Data are normalized to P (t0 = 1979) = 1. The solid curve is
the fit to Eq. (31). The star is the predicted value for 2008.
The vertical lines indicate the obtained critical time tc and
its error quotes.
Greece. This is due to the fact that the measured price
index reached very large values determining the position
of the singularity much better than in the former cases.
In Fig. 7 we plotted the growth rate r(t) evaluated ac-
cording to Eq. (4), i.e., by calculating the first differences
of the natural logarithm of the price index. These data
are reproduced very well by Eq. (24) cast into the form
r(t) = C0∆t
(
tc − t0
tc − t
)1+α
, (41)
and computed with the parameters listed in Table I. A
similar plot was also given by Nielsen [15], however, he
did not include the last three data.
We must emphasize that the present model is able to
reproduce the whole series of measured data. The last ob-
servations match very well into the general trend towards
the “explosion”. The obtained tc predicts a crash at the
beginning of 1994:03. The hyperinflation was stopped
with a successful complete currency reform at the end of
1994:01.
D. The current tragic case of Zimbabwe
In 1963 Southern Rhodesia (also known as Rhodesia)
chose to remain a colony when its two partners (Zam-
bia and Malawi) voted for independence. The coun-
try achieved independence on 17 April 1980, under the
name Zimbabwe. At that time the Zimbabwe dollar (ZW-
Dollar, the official symbol is ZWD) was worth about 1.50
US dollar. Since the beginning there was a persistent but
moderate structural inflation. Figure 8 shows the yearly
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price index taken from files of the Central Statistical Of-
fice (CSO) and the Reserve Bank of Zimbabwe (RBZ).
By looking at Fig. 8 one may realize that an important
acceleration of the price index started with the beginning
of the new century. This behavior appeared after the
Zimbabwean government proceeded to finance: i) the ex-
penditure to pay the war veterans gratitudes in 1997; ii)
the intervention in the Democratic Republic of Congo’s
war in 1998; and iii) the expenses of a program of land
reforms based on the redistribution of properties in 2000.
The latter undertaking, in practice, led to a weakling of
the agricultural industry and this in turn produced a fall
of export revenues. The resulting deficit was covered by
seigniorage. In this way Zimbabwe started to experience
hyperinflation [33].
Annual inflation reached about 600% in 2003:12, then
fell back to low triple digits in 2004 before rising again
to 600% at end of 2005. In 2006:02, the RBZ announced
that the government had printed 2.1×1013 ZW-Dollar in
order to buy foreign currency to pay off IMF arrears. In
2006:04 the year-to-year inflation reached above 1,000%.
In 2006:08, the Zimbabwean government issued new cur-
rency slashing three zeros, 1 new Dollar was exchanged
for 1,000 old Dollars. The highest denomination was then
1000 new Dollars. The new money did not provide re-
lief from record inflation. Surging to a new high above
2,000% in 2007:03 and in 2007:06 rose 7,251%. Price rises
have sharply accelerated in recent months. The CSO
stopped providing data on inflation in October saying
that key goods are not available in stores. In other words,
this is a recognition that the black market already dom-
inates the domestic economy. The denomination of the
largest currency notes is increasing steadily, in 2007:12
the RBZ unveiled new currency notes with denomination
as high as 750,000 ZW-Dollars. In a memo sent at the
end of December to financial institutions to help them
close their 2007 books, the RBZ communicated that the
estimated inflation over the past 12 months has totaled
24,059%.
The Consumer Council of Zimbabwe and other ob-
servers questioned whether the figures provided offi-
cially reflected the true cost of living. They stated
that real figure is almost certainly much larger. Re-
cent estimates of Zimbabwean inflation by independent
economists have tended to put it substantially higher
ranging from 50,000% to 100,000%. In any case, the
Zimbabwe’s inflation is already the highest in the world
and has reached that of Latin America’s in the 1980’s.
For instance, compare with the data of Peru plotted in
Fig. 1.
The high inflation makes transacting in ZW-Dollars
pointless. Indeed the RBZ has already confirmed that
certain farmers will receive US-Dollar prices for their
crops. The severely devalued currency is also causing
many organizations to favor using the US-Dollar instead
of ZW-Dollar. In actual fact, Zimbabwe is closely track-
ing Germany’s Weimar Republic in the early 1920’s. In-
deed, there is a close parallel between the evolution of
exchange rate of the ZW-Dollar in the period 2005-2007
and that of German Marks in 1921-1923. Nowadays, the
official exchange rate is 30,739 new ZW-Dollars to a sin-
gle US-Dollar. A total devaluation since 1980 amounts
about 5×107 a value similar to the cumulated price index
plotted in Fig. 8. Therefore, it is expected that some form
of “US-dollarization” will establish itself in Zimbabwe in
the near future. This behavior would be in line with pre-
vious experiences. It should be remained that during the
hyperinflation many monetary transactions in Yugoslavia
were actually taking place in German Marks rather than
local currency.
A fit of the yearly price index to Eq. (31) yielded the
values of the free parameters and χ quoted in Table I.
The good quality of the adjustment is depicted in Fig.
8. The predicted critical time tc = 2009.5 indicates that
the finite-time singularity, in other words the economic
explosion, will occur at mid-2009. By using the obtained
parameters we calculated the price index for the end of
2008, the result 8.26× 1012 is marked by a star in Fig. 8.
This value yields 5× 106% for the year-to-year inflation.
The uncertainties were estimated by assuming a quote of
25% for the error of measured inflation. The obtained
error bars for tc are also displayed in Fig. 8.
Zimbabwe’s hyperinflation is spiraling to unknown
places and could cause the country’s economy to com-
pletely collapse within two years. Due to continued
runaway inflation, the RBZ released into circulation in
2008:01 three very high denomination bearer checks: 1
million ZWD, 5 million ZWD and 10 million ZWD (look
at Ref. [28]), these banknotes will hold tender until July
2008. The latter is worth about 330 USD at official
exchange rate, but only 3 USD in the black market.
The Olivera-Tanzi effect is already present. Economic
prospects are bleak, reports of extreme shortages of basic
foodstuffs, fuel, and medical supplies abound. Moreover,
such prospects also indicate that gross domestic prod-
uct will continue to contract in 2008. Unemployment is
around 80 percent and political unrest is growing (the
next presidential elections are scheduled for 2008). In
summary, this is the worst economic crisis since indepen-
dence from Britain in 1980.
Therefore, in order to avoid a crash in the near future
the government of Zimbabwe should introduce as soon as
possible fundamental reforms in the economy.
E. Comparison of severe episodes of hyperinflation
In order to compare the most severe cases we evaluated
the time τ2(t) required to double the price index by using
Eq. (35). In this category we included the episodes of
Germany, Greece, Yugoslavia, and Hungary. In the latter
case the values of α and B determined by Sornette et al.
[5] were used, these data are also quoted in Table II. The
results for the last 180 days previous to the singularity
are plotted in Fig. 9. This comparison indicates that at
the end of the cycles Yugoslavia and Hungary suffered
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FIG. 9: Time interval needed for doubling the price index in
the most severe episodes of hyperinflation as a function of the
time before the crash. The solid curve stands for Yugoslavia,
the dashed curve for Hungary, the dot-dashed curve for Ger-
many, and the dotted curve for Greece.
the worst effects.
IV. SUMMARY
A study of a few important episodes of hyperinflation
is reported. The applied formulation is basically that of
Sornette et al. [5]. One difference is that in the present
work the expression for cumulated price index is written
in terms of free parameters of the model instead of in-
troducing combinations of them like quantities A and B
defined in Eqs. (33) and (34). In this way the parameters
preserve their own physical meaning. Moreover, the ini-
tial time t0 is explicitly retained in the formulas to avoid
any misunderstanding. Another difference is the imple-
mentation of a procedure for estimating uncertainties of
the utilized free parameters. Since the coefficients A and
B of Ref. [5] are combinations of basic parameters their
uncertainties are correlated, the error analysis in such a
case would be much more complicated.
In the present model the growth rate is accelerating
such that the market price is growing as a power law
towards a spontaneous singularity. This behavior is de-
termined by “adaptive expectations” of the people. The
effect of other quantities of standard economic theories
does not contribute explicitly. It is worthwhile to no-
tice that whole cycles are described by fixed values of
the exponent γ, which preserve the model from possible
underestimation of expectations.
On the other hand, it is well-known that nature does
not have pure singularities in the mathematical sense of
the term. Such critical points are always rounded off or
smoothed out by the existence of friction and dissipation
and by the finiteness of the system. This is a well-known
feature of critical points [34]. Finite-time singularities are
similarly rounded-off by frictional effects given in the case
of a hyperinflation by currency and economic reforms.
The data of Peru were analyzed to check our proce-
dures. Therefore, the error analysis is reported in de-
tail. The study of the hyperinflation of Germany indi-
cates that when there are reliable data then the anal-
yses of series of price index and exchange rate lead to
very similar results. This behavior confirms that foreign
exchange rate of hyperinflation is positively correlated
with the countrys hyperinflation trend. However, once
the episode is finished it is important to reestablish ex-
change flexibility to allow reactions to local conditions.
We showed that the very extreme cases of Greece and
Yugoslavia can be well described by the present formal-
ism. It should be emphasized that both these examples
belong to the worst episodes in the hyperinflation cate-
gory, where the people expectations were directly influ-
enced by catastrophic situations described above. For
completeness, we also report a comparison of the most
severe cases by determining the time required to double
the price index.
The last example is, hitherto, rather similar to the
Latin America’s cases of the 80’s. However, according
to our quantitative results the government of Zimbabwe
should perform very deep changes in the economic sys-
tem within one year in order to prevent very dreadful
consequences for the society.
Let us finish emphasizing that these lessons should not
be lost, but instead should be kept in mind to avoid
the repetition of that unpleasing experiences. Moreover,
one should always remain the statement of Keynes [35],
namely that: “even the weakest government can enforce
inflation when it can enforce nothing else”.
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